Talks to restart as port of Vancouver lockout drags

Spanish Market: Biofuels, Biomass, Chemicals, Coal, Crude oil, Fertilizers, Metals
08/11/24

A labour disruption at the port of Vancouver is now into its fifth day, but the employers association and the locked-out union are to meet this weekend to try to strike a deal and get commodities moving again.

Workers belonging to the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) Local 514 on Canada's west coast have been locked out by the BC Maritime Employers Association (BCMEA) since 4 November. This came hours after the union implemented an overtime ban for its 730 ship and dock foreman members.

The two sides will meet on 9 November evening with the assistance of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) in an effort to end a 19-month long dispute as they negotiate a new collective agreement to replace the one that expired in March 2023. The FMCS was already recruited for meetings in October, but that did not culminate in a deal.

Natural resource-rich Canada is dependent on smooth operations at the port of Vancouver to reach international markets. The port is a major conduit for many dry and liquid bulk cargoes, including lumber, wood pellets and pulp, grains and agriculture products, caustic soda and sodium chlorate, sugar, coal, potash, sulphur, copper concentrates, zinc and lead concentrate, diesel and renewable diesel liquids and petroleum products. These account for about two-thirds of the movements through the port.

Grain operations and the Westshore coal terminal are unaffected while most petroleum products also continue to move, the Port of Vancouver said on 7 November.

As the parties head back to the bargaining table, the ILWU Local 514 meanwhile filed a complaint against the BCMEA on 7 November, alleging bargaining in bad faith, making threats, intimidation and coercion.

"The BCMEA is trying to undermine the union by attempting to turn members against its democratically-elected leadership and bargaining committee, said ILWU Local 514 president Frank Morena on 7 November. "They know their bully tactics won't work with our members but their true goal is to bully the federal government into intervention."

But that is just "another meritless claim," according to the BCMEA, who wants to restore supply chain operations as quickly as possible.

The union said BC ports would still be operating if the BCMEA did not overreact with a lockout.

"They are responsible for goods not being shipped to and from BC ports — not the union," Morena says.

The ILWU Local 514 was found to have bargained in bad faith itself already, according to a decision by the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) in October.

Billions of dollars of trade are at risk with many goods and commodities at a standstill at Vancouver, which is Canada's busiest port. A 13-day strike by ILWU longshore workers in July 2023 disrupted C$10bn ($7.3bn) worth of goods and commodities, especially those reliant on container ships, before an agreement was met.

By Brett Holmes

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08/11/24

Market realities force Opec+ to delay supply boost

London, 8 November (Argus) — Eight Opec+ members have opted to delay a plan to begin raising crude output from December by one month, as slowing global oil demand growth and rising supply keep the pressure on prices. The eight — Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman — had already postponed, by two months to December, their plan to start returning supply. But they have now "agreed to extend the November 2023 voluntary production adjustments of 2.2mn b/d for one month until the end of December 2024", the Opec secretariat said on 3 November. The decision was made to avoid potential oversupply given a well-supplied market after heavy refinery maintenance, one Opec+ delegate said. Expectations of slower demand also led Saudi Aramco to cuts its December official formula prices this week for customers in Asia-Pacific. End-of-year volatility and uncertainty about Chinese oil demand also played their part in the decision, giving the group more time to see whether China's economy responds positively to Beijing's stimulus measures and to assess market trends for the first quarter, the delegate added. But at least one Opec source was unhappy with the postponement and concerned that Opec+ has missed its chance to increase supply. "When do we bring back our barrels?" the source said. "No-one knows." Rising non-Opec+ production from the US, Guyana, Brazil and elsewhere is already expected to meet slowing growth in demand next year. And concerns about the outlook for global oil demand are intensifying in light of slower-than-expected growth in China. The IEA expects oversupply of 1mn b/d next year even without the additional Opec+ oil returning to the market. The re-election of Donald Trump as US president could further alter the supply-demand balance in a way that does not favour the return of Opec+ crude. Trump's threat of tariffs and trade wars once in office may heighten concerns over slowing economic growth in China and other key markets. And his Iran policy could further destabilise a region on the brink of a sustained wider conflict. Still, Opec delegates see Trump's promises of cutting energy prices for US consumers as electioneering staples that he will be unable to deliver in practical terms. US shale producers are already producing at record levels and are likely to keep production growth restrained as they prioritise shareholder returns. Conformity focus But market dynamics are not the only drivers of Opec+ decision-making. Many in the group face internal political and financial pressure to increase production and oil revenue. Given this background, the decision to delay the production increase keeps the focus on those in the group that have been overshooting their output targets — namely Iraq, Russia and Kazakhstan. The secretariat made a point of underlining the wider group's "collective commitment to achieve full conformity" on 3 November, with a focus on those three countries. While Iraq, Kazakhstan and Russia have made some progress in reducing output in recent months, all three remained above their effective targets in October under their latest publicly available compensation plans. Kazakhstan fell around 60,000 b/d short of its promise to deliver extra production cuts, according to Ar gus ' latest estimates, having reduced output by around 200,000 b/d to 1.26mn b/d. Iraq was still above its Opec+ target of 4mn b/d and 130,000 b/d above its effective target under its compensation plan. Russia's production was bang on its formal Opec+ target, but 10,000 b/d above its effective target under its compensation plan, which stipulated a first cut of 10,000 b/d in October. Opec+ crude production mn b/d Oct Sep* Target† ± target Opec 9 21.23 21.18 21.23 +0.00 Non-Opec 9 12.12 12.30 12.62 -0.51 Total 33.35 33.48 33.85 -0.50 *revised †includes additional cuts where applicable Opec wellhead production mn b/d Oct Sep Target† ± target Saudi Arabia 8.95 8.92 8.98 -0.03 Iraq 4.03 4.07 4.00 +0.03 Kuwait 2.43 2.46 2.41 +0.02 UAE 2.93 2.95 2.91 +0.02 Algeria 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.00 Nigeria 1.42 1.36 1.50 -0.08 Congo (Brazzaville) 0.27 0.24 0.28 -0.01 Gabon 0.23 0.21 0.17 +0.06 Equatorial Guinea 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.01 Opec 9 21.23 21.18 21.23 +0.00 Iran 3.30 3.37 na na Libya 1.08 0.55 na na Venezuela 0.90 0.90 na na Total Opec 12^ 26.51 26.00 na na †includes additional cuts where applicable ^Iran, Libya and Venezuela are exempt from production targets Non-Opec crude production mn b/d Oct Sep* Target† ± target Russia 8.97 8.97 8.98 -0.00 Oman 0.76 0.76 0.76 +0.00 Azerbaijan 0.48 0.48 0.55 -0.07 Kazakhstan 1.26 1.46 1.47 -0.20 Malaysia 0.32 0.32 0.40 -0.08 Bahrain 0.16 0.16 0.20 -0.04 Brunei 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.01 Sudan 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.05 South Sudan 0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.07 Total non-Opec 12.12 12.30 12.62 -0.51 *revised †includes additional cuts where applicable Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Trump to zero in on Iran’s oil exports - will it work ?

08/11/24

Trump to zero in on Iran’s oil exports - will it work ?

London, 8 November (Argus) — Donald Trump's return to the White House poses questions for the oil market, not least what it might mean for Iran's rising crude exports. Early signs suggest Trump intends to dial up the pressure on Tehran and its oil sales, but repeating the playbook from his first presidency is unlikely to deliver the same result today. Iran's oil exports have been on the rise since Joe Biden's election win against Trump four years ago. Before he took office, Biden's talk on the campaign trail about wanting to revive the 2015 nuclear deal — which Trump reneged on in 2018 before reimposing sanctions on Iran — created space for a relative easing of tensions. That, in turn, paved the way for a recovery in Iranian oil sales. Iran's crude and condensate exports were averaging below 500,000 b/d throughout the second half of 2019 and 2020 as Trump-era sanctions took effect, but they began to tick up in 2021 and have carried on rising ever since. Exports averaged around 1.6mn b/d in January-October this year, according to data from analytics firms Kpler and Vortexa, just 500,000-600,000 b/d short of what Iran was selling in the two years before the sanctions were reimposed. Biden's detractors, many from across the aisle, pointed to the recovery in Iran's exports as proof that his administration was not properly enforcing the sanctions imposed under Trump, and that it was intentionally looking the other way. Biden's team regularly dismissed those claims, insisting enforcement was ongoing. The truth is that there is a cat and mouse game between sanctions enforcers and countries under sanctions. It took Iran 18 months to rebuild networks bypassing the sanctions regime. Russia, subject to a less onerous G7 price cap, similarly figured out ways to break through the sanctions noose. A batch of Iranian tanker-focused sanctions imposed under Biden since late last year appears to have had an effect on delivered prices to China, and yet Iran's exports have continued to climb. Those were the days A second Trump presidency will bring an opportunity for change. Given his first administration's hawkish stance towards Iran, there is an overwhelming expectation that he and his new team will set out to tighten the economic grip on Iran in an effort to limit Tehran's ability to financially support its proxies in the region. The stated goal of Trump's maximum pressure campaign in 2018 was to drive Iran's oil exports to zero, from above 2mn b/d. And although it ultimately failed to deliver that, reducing exports to less than a quarter of pre-sanctions levels still constituted success. However, repeating that success in 2025 and beyond will be a tall order. Analysts canvassed by Argus argue that pressing ahead with sanctions, even with stricter enforcement, would at best deliver a limited reduction, largely because Iranian oil trade today is not what it was in 2018. "Today, everyone who had been wary of the implications of being involved has already left the game. And those who do remain are those who do not necessarily fear sanctions," said Iman Nasseri, managing director for the Middle East at consultancy FGE. In 2018, around-three quarters of Iran's 2mn b/d or so of exports went to buyers in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Turkey and the UAE. The rest was going to China, to a mix of state-owned and private-sector companies. The threat of sanctions subsequently deterred almost everyone from taking Iranian crude except for Chinese independent refiners, pushing Tehran's exports below 500,000 b/d. Chinese independents have since gradually increased their intake of discounted Iranian crude to the point that they have been collectively taking around 1.5mn b/d in recent months. The remaining 100,000-200,000 b/d has been going to Iran's allies Syria and Venezuela. "With the majority of exports going to independent and private players in China who are not really worried about sanctions, or exposed to the US financial market, we should not expect a change in their behaviour," Nasseri says. "At best, we could be looking at a fall of 200,000-500,000 b/d" owing to increased enforcement. Homayoun Falakshahi, senior oil analyst at Kpler, also expects limited results should Trump choose to again focus his efforts on sanctions and enforcement, unless he is prepared to work with Beijing to put pressure on those independent refiners that are single-handedly keeping Iran's oil lifeline open. "Trump could try to trade off the Iranian issue with something of more significance to China," Falakshahi said, although he admits it will be "very difficult" to convince Beijing. "There would be significant pushback from Chinese officials, especially now, when refining margins are weak," he said. "You would be taking out one of the cheapest feedstocks going to Chinese refiners." Falakshahi sees no real impact in the short term, given the vast and intricate network of middlemen and entities that Iran has built to facilitate its oil trade in recent years. But the market "could see a decrease of 500,000-600,000 b/d in Iranian exports" by the summer of 2025, he said. A different approach Another challenge for the new Trump administration is the speed at which Iran has been expanding its tanker fleet in recent years. Biden's administration has responded with a record number of vessel-specific sanctions this year. "And that could go further after Trump takes office," said Armen Azizian, senior oil risk analyst at Vortexa. Some of the tankers that have been sanctioned by the US are "having difficulties on the water", he added. "We've seen cargoes on the water for longer, and some other tankers have been restricted to domestic trade. If they were to sanction more VLCCs, you would see an impact." Even so, Tehran still has plenty of opportunity to carry on expanding its fleet. "Iran has been growing its dark fleet for two years now," Azizian said. "The average age of the VLCCs joining the dark fleet has been 18 years, and there are many candidates that could join over the next year. So, while Trump could change how things are done, so long as Iran continues to expand its fleet, it shouldn't have a problem continuing its trade." By Nader Itayim Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Canada climate plans not equally at risk post-Trudeau

08/11/24

Canada climate plans not equally at risk post-Trudeau

Toronto, 8 November (Argus) — Canada's climate policies will be overhauled if prime minister Justin Trudeau loses an upcoming federal election, but the Conservative Party might not move to roll back all of the programs. Trudeau over nine years in office has pushed through a raft of carbon pricing policies, cracked down on provinces with insufficiently ambitious plans, and even started a global "challenge" to spur more jurisdictions to price emissions. But Canada's policies have exacerbated cost-of-living concerns at a time when voters across the world are punishing incumbents for inflation, and Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has barnstormed the country with a pledge to "axe the tax." An election must happen no later than October 2025, and the ruling Liberals are down significantly in polls. "We are going to see change, significant change," said Lisa DeMarco, a senior partner at the law firm Resilient and a member of the International Emissions Trading Association board at the Canada Clean Fuels and Carbon Markets Summit in Toronto, Ontario, this week. What "axe the tax" might mean in practice is uncertain. Inevitable targets are the country's federal fuel charge, currently at C$80/t ($57.54/t) and set to gradually increase to C$170/t in 2030, and a recently proposed greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade program for upstream oil and gas producers. But other policies, especially those with industry support, could remain. The country's distinct system for taxing industrial emissions, which includes a federal output-based pricing system that functions as a performance standard, "will likely be untouched," said former Conservative leader Erin O'Toole. A point of debate at the conference was what Poilievre might do with the country's clean fuel regulations, which function similarly to California's long-running low-carbon fuel standard and have boosted biofuel usage in the country. The policy is "certainly not at the top of the list" of Conservative priorities, said Andy Brosnan, president of low-carbon fuels at environmental products marketer Anew Climate. But that does not mean it will escape scrutiny. Conservatives could tinker with the program or push through more muscular changes like excluding electric vehicles, said David Beaudoin, chief executive of the climate consultancy NEL-i. "We should expect that regulation will be maybe not dismantled but somehow changed, perhaps fundamentally," Beaudoin said. In the gap left by the federal government, provinces could make up the difference with their own climate programs, panelists agreed. Quebec for instance has a linked carbon market with California, and British Columbia has its own low-carbon fuel standard. But policymakers should heed the lessons of Trudeau's declining popularity and reorient how they approach climate policy, O'Toole argued. "Try to be minimally disruptive on economically vulnerable citizens," he said. "Try not to pit industry against industry or region of the country against region." By Cole Martin Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Spain eyes renewed Algerian urea trade

08/11/24

Spain eyes renewed Algerian urea trade

Amsterdam, 8 November (Argus) — The Algerian government appears set to resurrect its commercial agreement with Spain, having stopped trade in June 2022 following a political dispute, prompting the potential renewal of urea shipments between the countries. The return of trade between Algeria and Spain is increasingly likely, as tensions between the countries ease. Algeria announced an end to its side of a 2002 co-operation agreement with Spain in June 2022 following a dispute related to the Western Sahara. Details regarding the expected renewal of the agreement are scant so far, and Spanish importers are unclear as to how and when trade can return. The potential restart of urea shipments is only likely to emerge after the start of 2025, as suppliers will have to wait for fresh export licences with Spain listed as a permitted destination, traders said. Trading firms are typically granted annual export licences before the start of each year. Algeria was the largest supplier of urea to Spain in 2021, accounting for a third of the 1mn t imported that year. Egypt has since taken Algeria's market share, with its exports making up just over 40pc of Spanish urea imports so far this year. Algeria has 3.6mn t/yr of granular urea capacity, with AOA operating two 1.2mn t/yr plants and Sorfert the remaining 1.2mn t/yr facility. By Harry Minihan Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Argentina’s YPF sees jump in shale oil output

08/11/24

Argentina’s YPF sees jump in shale oil output

Montevideo, 8 November (Argus) — Argentina's state-owned YPF saw output of unconventional crude surge by 36pc to 126,000 b/d in the third quarter of the year compared to a year earlier. YPF's third quarter statement put total production at 559,000 b/d of oil equivalent (boe/d) with crude at 256,000 b/d, up by 8pc, and natural gas at 40.3mn m³/d, or 253,000 boe/d, an increase of 7pc, and 49,000 boe/d of natural gas liquids, up by 4pc. Unconventional crude accounted for 49pc of overall output. It was 39pc of total production a year earlier. YPF is the major player in Vaca Muerta, Argentina's unconventional formation that holds an estimated 16bn bl of crude and 308 trillion cf of gas, according to the US Energy Information Administration. The formation is at the heart of YPF's plans for Argentina to produce 1mn bl of crude and export up to 30mn metric tonnes/yr of LNG by the end of the decade. YPF is now Argentina's largest crude exporter, dispatching an average of 40,000 b/d in the third quarter, nearly all of this going by pipeline to neighboring Chile, according to Federico Barroetavena, chief financial officer. He said the company invested $1.35bn in the third quarter, with more than 70pc on upstream. It drilled 50 wells in the third quarter. YPF is moving ahead with its southern Vaca Muerta oil pipeline as it looks for partners for the full project. It has completed 50pc of the first 130km (81.4mi) segment. The second 440km, as well as storage tanks and a monobuoy platform, will require $2.5bn. The company anticipates construction to start in the first quarter of 2025. The initial capacity will be 180,000 b/d in 2026, increasing to 500,000 b/d in 2027 and, eventually, to 700,000 b/d. YPF is also the largest shareholder, with 37pc, in the Oldelval pipeline from Vaca Muerta to the coast. It is undergoing an expansion to 530,000 b/d in 2025. The state-owned energy company, Enarsa, completed in October the reversal of the country's northern gas pipeline to move Vaca Muerta gas to the north of the country. It will move more than 15mn m³/d of gas to northern Argentina. It previously moved gas from northern gas fields, now depleted, and Bolivia, to the capital, Buenos Aires. By Lucien Chauvin Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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