Trump’s LNG plans could shape Mexico’s gas ambitions

Spanish Market: Natural gas
27/12/24

US president-elect Donald Trump's pledge to lift the pause on LNG export permits to non-free trade agreement (non-FTA) countries could reshape Mexico's LNG ambitions and its role in global gas trade.

Trump, set to take office on 20 January, has vowed to reverse a decision by President Joe Biden's administration in January 2024 to halt LNG export permits pending a study on their environmental and economic impacts.

This decision directly affects all seven LNG export terminals planned on Mexico's west coast, which together represent nearly 60 million tonnes (t)/year of projected export capacity. These projects rely on permits to sell LNG to non-FTA nations, making them pivotal in positioning the US and Mexico — bolstered by prolific gas production from the Permian Basin — as a top global LNG player.

Yet, even with permitting renewed under Trump, domestic US politics could pose risks to Mexico's LNG projects.

"The US has a fundamental interest in accelerating west coast Mexican LNG development," said Joe Webster, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center. "Constructing LNG terminals in this region would address the Permian Basin's increasingly ‘gassy' gas/oil ratio while strengthening energy ties with the Indo-Pacific."

But not everyone agrees. Another market source told Argus that Trump's recent rhetoric about regaining control of the Panama Canal suggests his government may favor US-based LNG facilities over Mexican projects. Additionally, the Republican-led Congress could complicate matters. In October, Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan proposed legislation to restrict gas exports to "corrupt governments," explicitly including Mexico. With Republicans controlling both chambers, such measures could gain traction if Trump backs them to further his broader agenda.

Trump's priorities lie in migration, security and inward investment, said Duncan Wood, president of the Pacific Council on International Policy. Trump is likely to leverage US-Mexico energy relations, including unresolved US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement disputes, to pursue these goals.

Permit deadlines loom

Four of Mexico's seven Pacific LNG projects already hold non-FTA permits, including Alliance LNG's Amigo project in Guaymas; Sempra's ECA Phase 2, Ensenada; Mexico Pacific's Saguaro Energia LNG Phases 1 and 2, Puerto Libertad; and Vista Pacifico, Topolobampo; a joint venture between Sempra, TotalEnergies, and CFEnergia. These permits have expiration dates requiring the projects to begin operations or apply for extensions.

Alliance and Vista Pacifico hold permits valid until 2027 and 2029, respectively, but Saguaro's permit expires in December 2025, and ECA Phase 2 must begin by March 2026. Without final investment decisions, these projects risk missing their deadlines, even with Trump's Department of Energy (DOE) potentially easing extensions.

The permitting pause in 2024 may have already delayed timelines and hurt investor confidence. Whether Trump's reversal mitigates this damage remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration's recent study on LNG permitting warns that unchecked approvals could increase global greenhouse gas emissions and raise domestic natural gas prices. While this study may carry little weight under Trump, it could entrench anti-LNG sentiment among Democrats. Still, as US LNG exports are expected to double by 2028, Democrats with national ambitions may adopt a more pragmatic stance, Webster said.

Trump also inherits a new dynamic with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Initial interactions between the two have been cordial but tense. "Mexico's stance on US LNG exports remains unclear," Webster said. While Sheinbaum aligns with environmental movements, her pragmatic streak may lead her to use LNG projects as leverage in negotiations with Trump.

By James Young

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06/01/25

Canadian prime minister Trudeau to resign

Calgary, 6 January (Argus) — Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau said he will resign as soon as his Liberal Party selects a new leader to run in general elections expected later this year. Calls for Trudeau to resign have been growing for months but became too much to ignore as the Liberals continued to fall further behind the Conservative Party and its leader Pierre Poilievre in polling. Recent polls indicate the centre-right Conservatives would win a majority of seats in the House of Commons if an election were held today. "If I'm having to fight internal battles, I can't be the best option in that election," Trudeau said in Ottawa this morning. Parliament was set to return from a break on 27 January, at which time Conservatives were expected to attempt to trigger an election by way of a no-confidence vote. Canada's governor general — at Trudeau's request — extended the break until 24 March. That break will buy the Liberals time to find a new leader but it will be a tall order for any successor to both unite the party and also connect with Canadians on short notice before an expected spring election. "There will be confidence votes in March," said Trudeau, whose minority government has been propped up by the New Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP has helped Trudeau survive no-confidence votes in recent months, but on 20 December vowed that it would also bring the government down when it returned to session. Trudeau was elected as a member of parliament (MP) in 2008, leader of the Liberal Party in 2013, and has been prime minister since 2015 after defeating the then Stephen Harper-led Conservatives. There is no obvious replacement for Trudeau after deputy prime minister and finance minister Chrystia Freeland resigned last month , citing "costly political gimmicks," unrestrained spending and being at odds over the approach to the "grave challenge" of aggressive US nationalism. US president-elect Donald Trump has threatened a 25pc tariff on all imports from Canada and Mexico unless they tighten borders to crack down on drug trafficking and illegal migration into the US. Trudeau's plan to resign does not change the Conservative party's plans to call for new elections, Poilievre said today. "Every Liberal MP in power today and every potential leadership contender fighting for the top job helped Justin Trudeau break the country over the last nine years," he said. If elected, Poilievre plans to cut a number of environmental programs championed by the Liberals, including the carbon tax. The Conservatives support the continued use of oil and gas, exploration for hydrocarbons, and pipeline construction. The next federal election must occur on or before 25 October this year, according to the electoral calendar. By Brett Holmes Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

US Congress begins with focus on energy, taxes

03/01/25

US Congress begins with focus on energy, taxes

Some Republicans worry that their razor-thin House majority could soon see their caucus fractured, writes Chris Knight Washington, 3 January (Argus) — The new Republican majority in US Congress has set its sights on passing legislation to grow energy production, unwind climate policies and cut trillions of dollars in taxes, but doing so will require the party to overcome its history of infighting. That disharmony was on display last month, when Republicans in the House of Representatives nearly forced a government shutdown by scuttling a spending deal negotiated by their own leaders. Similar dynamics have been at play for the past two years, as rifts over how to govern made it difficult for House Republican leaders to use a tiny majority to extract policy concessions during negotiations. The first test of party unity in the 119th Congress — sworn in on 3 January — will come as House Republicans vote on whether to re-elect Mike Johnson as speaker with an even smaller majority than last year. Johnson can only afford to lose a handful of votes, assuming all Democrats vote against him, before Republicans risk a repeat of 2023, when far-right members ousted the last speaker but could not agree on a replacement for weeks. A lengthy voting impasse could delay the 6 January certification of the election victory of president-elect Donald Trump, who this week endorsed Johnson. Trump campaigned on passing legislation to allow industry to "drill, baby, drill" by increasing federal oil and gas lease sales, removing regulations and unwinding parts of outgoing president Joe Biden's signature Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Among the options are rescinding a fee on methane emissions that started at $900/t, and requiring more oil and gas lease sales in the US Gulf of Mexico. On taxes, Trump has proposed extending $4 trillion in cuts due to expire at the end of 2025, in addition to cutting corporate rates to as low as 15pc from 20pc, rescinding clean energy credits, and putting a 20pc tariff on all imports. Other items on Congress' to-do list include passing legislation to fund the government and raising the statutory limit on federal debt. Republicans also say they want to pass a bill to expedite federal permitting, after a bipartisan effort to do so failed to advance in December. Learning to two-step Republican leaders have floated a two-step plan to pass Trump's legislative agenda that would use "budget reconciliation" — a legislative manoeuvre that will prevent a Democratic filibuster in the Senate, but which limits the bill to provisions that will affect the federal budget. Senate majority leader John Thune, a Republican from Texas, has suggested packaging immigration, border security and energy policy into a first budget bill that would pass early this year. Republicans would then have more time to debate a separate — and far more complex — budget bill that would focus on taxes and spending. But some Republicans, mindful of a slim 220-215 House majority that will temporarily shrink because of upcoming vacancies, worry the two-part strategy could fracture the caucus. Republicans have yet to decide the changes to the IRA, which includes hundreds of billions of dollars of tax credits for wind, solar, electric vehicles, battery manufacturing, carbon capture and clean hydrogen. A group of 18 House Republicans last year said they opposed a "full repeal" of the law, which disproportionately benefits districts represented by Republicans. Republicans plan to use their expanded influence to push changes at all levels of government and the work it supports. Incoming Republican chairman of the Senate energy committee John Barrasso has issued a report urging OECD energy watchdog the IEA to revive the inclusion of a "business-as-usual" reference case in its annual World Energy Outlook. Barrasso says the IEA has lost its focus on energy security and instead become a "cheerleader" for the energy transition. Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Eni ready for FID on Mozambique’s Coral Norte FLNG

03/01/25

Eni ready for FID on Mozambique’s Coral Norte FLNG

London, 3 January (Argus) — Italian energy firm Eni is ready to take a final investment decision (FID) on its planned 3.4mn t/yr Coral Norte floating liquefaction (FLNG) terminal in Mozambique, should the project receive authorisation from the country's government, the firm has told Argus . Eni said it expects the government's approval to be "imminent", although it did not provide a more detailed timeline. The firm said in June 2023 that it planned to start operations at the FLNG in the second half of 2027. Eni already operates Mozambique's 3.4mn t/yr Coral Sul FLNG, which started operations in late 2022 and is at present the country's only LNG terminal. Coral Norte is set to be installed 20km north of Coral Sul. There are also two onshore terminals planned for Mozambique — the TotalEnergies-led 13.1mn t/yr Mozambique LNG project and ExxonMobil's 18mn t/yr Rovuma LNG project. Both are located in the Cabo Delgado province and have been halted because of security concerns. TotalEnergies reached a financial close on their Mozambique project in 2019 and declared force majeure in 2021, though project partner Bharat Petroleum (BPCL) said in late October 2024 the force majeure could be lifted in January or February this year because of an improvement in the security situation. And ExxonMobil said in November last year it was planning to take FID on the Rovuma project at the start of 2026. By Cerys Edwards Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

US oil sector sues Vermont over new climate law

02/01/25

US oil sector sues Vermont over new climate law

Washington, 2 January (Argus) — Oil industry and business groups are challenging a first-of-its-kind law in Vermont that would require fossil fuel producers to pay potentially billions of dollars in fines based on greenhouse gas emissions over the past 30 years. Vermont's law is "unprecedented" and attempts to "pin blame" on a narrow set of out-of-state energy producers for climate-related damages for decades of alleged greenhouse gas emissions, the American Petroleum Institute and the US Chamber of Commerce wrote in a lawsuit filed on 30 December. They argue the law is preempted by the federal Clean Air Act and violates the US Constitution's ban on excessive fines. "It punishes covered energy producers for greenhouse gas emissions related to the lawful production and use of their products and those emissions' purported impacts on climate change," the lawsuit said. Vermont's "Climate Superfund Act" was enacted last year and applies to oil, natural gas and coal producers and refineries found to have emitted at least 1bn metric tonnes (t) of greenhouse gases from 1995-2024. Under the law, Vermont will issue a "cost recovery demand" to those companies based on their emissions that will pay for climate adaptation projects. Vermont will have until 1 January 2027 to finalize specifics of how the program will work, including how to calculate the charge. The lawsuit, filed in a federal district court in Vermont, argues the state had exceeded its authority by trying to impose financial penalties on fossil fuel companies located "well beyond" its borders. The law also imposes an "overly harsh and oppressive retroactive penalty" and is based on an "arbitrary" calculation that focuses on the last 30 years of emissions, the lawsuit argues. Vermont governor Phil Scott (R), who allowed the law to take effect last summer without his signature, has raised concerns about the state's "go-it-alone" approach toward taking on "Big Oil". But New York governor Kathy Hochul (D) last week signed the state's own climate "Superfund" law, which is expected to raise $75bn over the next 25 years from fees on companies that exceed 1bn t of greenhouse gas emissions from 2000-2018. Massachusetts and Maryland are considering similar laws. By Chris Knight Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

02/01/25

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

London, 2 January (Argus) — The European Commission needs to provide clearer guidance on implementing existing rules for the cross-border trade of biomethane to foster a cohesive internal market as some EU member states are diverging from these standards, Vitol's Davide Rubini and Arthur Romano told Argus. Edited excerpts follow. What are the big changes happening in the regulation space of the European biomethane market that people need to watch out for? While no major new EU legislation is anticipated, the focus remains on the consistent implementation of existing rules, as some countries diverge from these standards. Key challenges include ensuring mass-balanced transport of biomethane within the grid, accurately accounting for cross-border emissions and integrating subsidised biomethane into compliance markets. The European Commission is urged to provide clearer guidance on these issues to foster a cohesive internal market, which is essential for advancing the EU's energy transition and sustainability objectives. Biomethane is a fairly mature energy carrier, yet it faces significant hurdles when it comes to cross-border trade within the EU. Currently, only a small fraction — 2-5pc — of biomethane is consumed outside of its country of production, highlighting the need for better regulatory alignment across member states. Would you be interested in seeing a longer-term target from the EU? The longer the visibility on targets and ambitions, the better it is for planning and investment. As the EU legislative cycle restarts with the new commission, the initial focus might be on the climate law and setting a new target for 2040. However, a review of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is unlikely for the next 3-4 years. With current targets set for 2030, just five years away, there's insufficient support for long-term investments. The EU's legislative cycle is fixed, so expectations for changes are low. Therefore, it's crucial that member states take initiative and extend their targets beyond 2030, potentially up to 2035, even if not mandated by the EU. Some member states might do so, recognising the need for longer-term targets to encourage the necessary capital expenditure for the energy transition. Do you see different interpretations in mass balancing, GHG accounting and subsidies? Interpretations of the rules around ‘mass-balancing', greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting and the usability of subsidised biomethane [for different fuel blending mandates] vary across EU member states, leading to challenges in creating a cohesive internal market. When it comes to mass-balancing, the challenges arise in trying to apply mass balance rules for liquids, which often have a physically traceable flow, to gas molecules in the interconnected European grid. Once biomethane is injected, physical verification becomes impossible, necessitating different rules than those for liquids moving around in segregated batches. The EU mandates that sustainability verification of biomethane occurs at the production point and requires mechanisms to prevent double counting and verification of biomethane transactions. However, some member states resist adapting these rules for gases, insisting on physical traceability similar to that of liquids. This resistance may stem from protectionist motives or political agendas, but ultimately it results in non-adherence to EU rules and breaches of European legislation. The issue with GHG accounting often stems from member states' differing interpretations of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Some states, like the Netherlands, argue that mass balance is an administrative method, which the guidelines supposedly exclude. Mass balancing involves rigorous verification by auditors and certifying bodies, ensuring a robust accounting system that is distinct from book and claim methods. This distinction is crucial because mass balance is based on verifying that traded molecules of biomethane are always accompanied by proofs of sustainability that are not a separately tradeable object. In fact, mass balancing provides a verifiable and accountable method that is perfectly aligned with UN guidelines and ensuring accurate GHG accounting. The issue related to the use of subsidised volumes of biomethane is highly political. Member states often argue that if they provide financial support — directly through subsidies or indirectly through suppliers' quotas — they should remain in control of the entire value chain. For example, if a member state gives feed-in tariffs to biomethane production, it may want to block exports of these volumes. Conversely, if a member state imposes a quota to gas suppliers, it may require this to be fulfilled with domestic biomethane production. No other commodity — not even football players — is subject to similar restrictions to export and/or imports only because subsidies are involved. This protectionist approach creates barriers to internal trade within the EU, hindering the development of a unified biomethane market and limiting the potential for growth and decarbonisation across the region. The Netherlands next year will implement two significant pieces of legislation — a green supply obligation for gas suppliers and a RED III transposition. The Dutch approach combines GHG accounting arguments with a rejection of EU mass-balance rules, essentially prohibiting biomethane imports unless physically segregated as bio-LNG or bio-CNG. This requirement contradicts EU law, as highlighted by the EU Commission's recent detailed opinion to the Netherlands . France's upcoming blending and green gas obligation, effective in 2026, mandates satisfaction through French production only. Similarly, the Czech Republic recently enacted a law prohibiting the export of some subsidised biomethane . Italy's transport system, while effective nationally, disregards EU mass balance rules. These cases indicate a deeper political disconnect and highlight the need for better alignment and communication within the EU. We know you've been getting a lot of questions around whether subsidised bio-LNG is eligible under FuelEU. What have your findings been? The eligibility of subsidised bio-LNG under FuelEU has been a topic of considerable enquiry. We've sought clarity from the European Commission, as this issue intersects multiple regulatory and legal frameworks. Initially, we interpreted EU law principles, which discourage double support, to mean that FuelEU, being a quota system, would qualify as a support scheme under Article 2's definition, equating quota systems with subsidies. However, a commission representative has publicly stated that FuelEU does not constitute a support scheme and thus is not subject to this interpretation. On this basis, FuelEU would not differentiate between subsidised and unsubsidised bio-LNG. A similar rationale applies to the Emissions Trading System, which, while not a quota obligation, has been deemed to not be a support scheme. Despite these clarifications, the use of subsidised biomethane across Europe remains an area requiring further elucidation from European institutions. It is not without risks, and stakeholders require more definitive guidance to navigate the regulatory landscape effectively. By Emma Tribe and Madeleine Jenkins Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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