LNG cannot offset halt of Russian gas flows to Europe

Spanish Market: Natural gas
28/01/22

Europe does not have enough LNG import capacity to entirely replace Russian pipeline gas supplies, should these halt or be hit by international sanctions in the event of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

A complete halt of Russian flows to Europe remains an extremely unlikely scenario. But the US government is assuming that transit through Ukraine would be cut in the event of an invasion and has also been preparing for the event of Russian supplies to Europe stopping altogether, even though it considers it less likely. In recent months, members of the European parliament have also called for the EU to phase out Russian gas imports.

With limited flexibility left with which to increase production or pipeline imports, ensuring sufficient gas supply to Europe in the event of a complete halt in Russian deliveries would fall almost entirely to the region's LNG terminals, which have already been bearing the brunt of offsetting dwindling Russian flows in recent months. Russian flows to Europe reached a low of about 10.3bn m³ (8mn t of LNG equivalent) in December, compared with 14bn m³ (10.9mn t of LNG) in December 2020. By contrast, LNG deliveries to Europe — excluding Turkey — rose to 6.90mn t last month, from 5.25mn t a year earlier, data from oil analytics firm Vortexa show.

As Russian pipeline flows have slowed further this month, Europe ramped up its LNG receipts, which have already totalled 8.6mn t since the start of January, on track to reach a new monthly record. Gazprom sales to Europe, excluding the Baltic states and Turkey, may have been about 3.25bn m³ (2.5mn t of LNG) in the first half of this month, based on the company's statements. Europe would have been short of about 1mn t of LNG this month if Russian flows had completely stopped, even with import terminals running at full capacity.

But terminal capacity caps how much Europe can rely on LNG, particularly during periods of peak demand, even before supply availability is considered.

Russian flows to Europe — excluding Baltic states, Moldova and Turkey — averaged 162.7bn m³/yr across 2017-20, before falling sharply to about 135bn m³ in 2021. Monthly imports over 2016-20 ranged between 9.5bn m³ in November 2021 and 16bn m³ in May 2019, the quickest in any given month since at least March 2016. These would be equivalent to 7.4mn-12.3mn t/month of LNG. But combined European import capacity — excluding Lithuania and Turkey — stands at about 151.5mn t/yr, or 12.6mn t/month — which would be barely able to accommodate LNG volumes equivalent to Russian pipeline flows, even if capacity were entirely available (see table).

This is not the case. Europe already receives LNG under long-term deals that takes up capacity at import terminals. Even when market prices in 2016-17 favoured sending gas to Asia-Pacific over Europe, European receipts ranged from 2mn-3.7mn t/month. About 2.2mn t/month of this is delivered under long-term contracts with no destination flexibility, Argus estimates, reducing the remaining available capacity at LNG terminals to 10.1mn-10.6mn t/month.

Furthermore, almost a third of Europe's regasification capacity — 44.1mn t/yr — is in the Iberian Peninsula, which has limited interconnection with the rest of Europe. Flows from France to Spain through the Pirineos pipeline could be net off if Spain receives more LNG, increasing supply availability in northwest Europe, but scope for physical reverse flows are capped by the pipeline capacity of about 19mn m³/d. Another 34.4mn t/yr is in the UK, which does not receive physical Russian flows, although it is connected to markets in which there is instead substantial scope for competition between supply sources. Russia's largest customer in Europe, Germany — which received 52.5bn m³ from Russia in 2020, according to EU statistics unit Eurostat — has no direct access to LNG.

Constraints in supply availability

Replacing Russian gas flows to Europe with LNG may also be hampered by supply availability, with historical flows broadly equating to total LNG production in the Atlantic basin at present.

Quicker global LNG production, as encouraged diplomatically by the US in recent days, would not only test European import capacity but would also face constraints in feedgas supply availability and issues with existing contractual obligations.

Technical production capacity in the Atlantic basin is only marginally higher than Europe's import capacity of about 14.5mn t/month, excluding Russian independent firm Novatek's 17.44mn t/yr Yamal plant, which could also be subject to hypothetical sanctions.

Overall LNG production within the Atlantic basin has ranged from 8.88mn-11.6mn t/month throughout 2021, excluding 1.6mn t/month from Russia's Yamal LNG export project. With global LNG prices having climbed to multi-year highs in recent months, producers already had an incentive to push output to its limits, suggesting there is limited flexibility left with which to further ramp up production. LNG production from Trinidad and most of west Africa has remained well below capacity in recent months, mainly as a result of issues with upstream gas supply.

And while the majority of Atlantic basin cargoes are sold free of destination clauses, there are still some volumes that are tied to long-term contracts with Asian buyers. The US has long-term agreements with Asian buyers on a des basis totalling about 2mn t, which would limit the scope for all US supply to be shipped to Europe, although this would still leave about 7.2mn t of more flexible supply on a monthly basis.

US administration officials have been in discussion with suppliers outside the Atlantic basin, such as Qatar and even Australia. But Qatar may have limited uncommitted volumes to supply to Europe following the start of a number of new deals with Asian buyers at the start of this year. The country's 77mn t/yr Ras Laffan export complex ran at well above its nameplate capacity for nine months to meet the unexpected jump in Japanese gas demand in the aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011. But while it may be able to use its peak production for a short period, it is unlikely to be able to sustain peak output for an extended period by postponing regular maintenance, as it could in 2011 when many of its liquefaction trains were still quite new.

By Ellie Holbrook

European LNG import terminals		mn t/yr
Name	Location	Import capacity

Zeebrugge	Belgium	7.2
Krk	Croatia	2.0
Fos Tonkin	France	1.2
Montoir-de-Bretagne	France	8.0
Fos Cavaou	France	6.5
Dunkerque	France	12.4
Revithoussa	Greece	4.9
Panigaglia	Italy	2.5
Adriatic LNG	Italy	5.7
OLT Toscana	Italy	3.0
Gate	Netherlands	8.7
Swinoujscie	Poland	3.9
Sines	Portugal	6.8
Barcelona	Spain	12.6
Huelva	Spain	8.7
Cartagena	Spain	8.7
Bilbao	Spain	5.1
Sagunto	Spain	6.4
Mugardos	Spain	2.6
South Hook LNG	UK	15.6
Dragon	UK	4.0
Isle of Grain	UK	14.8

Europe's LNG imports vs Russian pipeline supply mn t

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02/01/25

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

London, 2 January (Argus) — The European Commission needs to provide clearer guidance on implementing existing rules for the cross-border trade of biomethane to foster a cohesive internal market as some EU member states are diverging from these standards, Vitol's Davide Rubini and Arthur Romano told Argus. Edited excerpts follow. What are the big changes happening in the regulation space of the European biomethane market that people need to watch out for? While no major new EU legislation is anticipated, the focus remains on the consistent implementation of existing rules, as some countries diverge from these standards. Key challenges include ensuring mass-balanced transport of biomethane within the grid, accurately accounting for cross-border emissions and integrating subsidised biomethane into compliance markets. The European Commission is urged to provide clearer guidance on these issues to foster a cohesive internal market, which is essential for advancing the EU's energy transition and sustainability objectives. Biomethane is a fairly mature energy carrier, yet it faces significant hurdles when it comes to cross-border trade within the EU. Currently, only a small fraction — 2-5pc — of biomethane is consumed outside of its country of production, highlighting the need for better regulatory alignment across member states. Would you be interested in seeing a longer-term target from the EU? The longer the visibility on targets and ambitions, the better it is for planning and investment. As the EU legislative cycle restarts with the new commission, the initial focus might be on the climate law and setting a new target for 2040. However, a review of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is unlikely for the next 3-4 years. With current targets set for 2030, just five years away, there's insufficient support for long-term investments. The EU's legislative cycle is fixed, so expectations for changes are low. Therefore, it's crucial that member states take initiative and extend their targets beyond 2030, potentially up to 2035, even if not mandated by the EU. Some member states might do so, recognising the need for longer-term targets to encourage the necessary capital expenditure for the energy transition. Do you see different interpretations in mass balancing, GHG accounting and subsidies? Interpretations of the rules around ‘mass-balancing', greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting and the usability of subsidised biomethane [for different fuel blending mandates] vary across EU member states, leading to challenges in creating a cohesive internal market. When it comes to mass-balancing, the challenges arise in trying to apply mass balance rules for liquids, which often have a physically traceable flow, to gas molecules in the interconnected European grid. Once biomethane is injected, physical verification becomes impossible, necessitating different rules than those for liquids moving around in segregated batches. The EU mandates that sustainability verification of biomethane occurs at the production point and requires mechanisms to prevent double counting and verification of biomethane transactions. However, some member states resist adapting these rules for gases, insisting on physical traceability similar to that of liquids. This resistance may stem from protectionist motives or political agendas, but ultimately it results in non-adherence to EU rules and breaches of European legislation. The issue with GHG accounting often stems from member states' differing interpretations of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Some states, like the Netherlands, argue that mass balance is an administrative method, which the guidelines supposedly exclude. Mass balancing involves rigorous verification by auditors and certifying bodies, ensuring a robust accounting system that is distinct from book and claim methods. This distinction is crucial because mass balance is based on verifying that traded molecules of biomethane are always accompanied by proofs of sustainability that are not a separately tradeable object. In fact, mass balancing provides a verifiable and accountable method that is perfectly aligned with UN guidelines and ensuring accurate GHG accounting. The issue related to the use of subsidised volumes of biomethane is highly political. Member states often argue that if they provide financial support — directly through subsidies or indirectly through suppliers' quotas — they should remain in control of the entire value chain. For example, if a member state gives feed-in tariffs to biomethane production, it may want to block exports of these volumes. Conversely, if a member state imposes a quota to gas suppliers, it may require this to be fulfilled with domestic biomethane production. No other commodity — not even football players — is subject to similar restrictions to export and/or imports only because subsidies are involved. This protectionist approach creates barriers to internal trade within the EU, hindering the development of a unified biomethane market and limiting the potential for growth and decarbonisation across the region. The Netherlands next year will implement two significant pieces of legislation — a green supply obligation for gas suppliers and a RED III transposition. The Dutch approach combines GHG accounting arguments with a rejection of EU mass-balance rules, essentially prohibiting biomethane imports unless physically segregated as bio-LNG or bio-CNG. This requirement contradicts EU law, as highlighted by the EU Commission's recent detailed opinion to the Netherlands . France's upcoming blending and green gas obligation, effective in 2026, mandates satisfaction through French production only. Similarly, the Czech Republic recently enacted a law prohibiting the export of some subsidised biomethane . Italy's transport system, while effective nationally, disregards EU mass balance rules. These cases indicate a deeper political disconnect and highlight the need for better alignment and communication within the EU. We know you've been getting a lot of questions around whether subsidised bio-LNG is eligible under FuelEU. What have your findings been? The eligibility of subsidised bio-LNG under FuelEU has been a topic of considerable enquiry. We've sought clarity from the European Commission, as this issue intersects multiple regulatory and legal frameworks. Initially, we interpreted EU law principles, which discourage double support, to mean that FuelEU, being a quota system, would qualify as a support scheme under Article 2's definition, equating quota systems with subsidies. However, a commission representative has publicly stated that FuelEU does not constitute a support scheme and thus is not subject to this interpretation. On this basis, FuelEU would not differentiate between subsidised and unsubsidised bio-LNG. A similar rationale applies to the Emissions Trading System, which, while not a quota obligation, has been deemed to not be a support scheme. Despite these clarifications, the use of subsidised biomethane across Europe remains an area requiring further elucidation from European institutions. It is not without risks, and stakeholders require more definitive guidance to navigate the regulatory landscape effectively. By Emma Tribe and Madeleine Jenkins Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: US Supreme Court tees up more energy cases

31/12/24

Viewpoint: US Supreme Court tees up more energy cases

Washington, 31 December (Argus) — The US Supreme Court is on track for another term that could significantly affect the energy sector, with rulings anticipated in the new year that could narrow environmental reviews and challenge California's authority to set its own tailpipe standards. The Supreme Court earlier this month held arguments in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v Eagle County, Colorado , a case in which the justices are being asked to decide whether federal rail regulators adequately studied the environmental effects of a proposed 88-mile railway that would transport 80,000 b/d of crude. A lower court last year found the review, prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), should have analyzed how building the project would affect drilling and refining. Business groups want the Supreme Court to issue an expansive ruling that would limit NEPA reviews only to "proximate" effects, such as how rail traffic could affect nearby wildlife, rather than reviewing distance effects. The court recently agreed to hear a separate case that could restrict California's unique authority under the Clean Air Act to issue its own greenhouse gas regulations for newly sold cars and pickup trucks that are more stringent than federal standards. Oil refiners and biofuel producers in that case, Diamond Alternative Energy v EPA , say they should have "standing" to advance a lawsuit challenging those standards — even though they could now show prevailing in the case would change fuel demand — based on the alleged "coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties". These two cases, likely to be decided by the end of June, follow on the heels of the court's blockbuster decision in June overturning the decades-old "Chevron deference", a foundation for administration law that had given federal agencies greater flexibility when writing regulations. Last term, the court also limited agency enforcement powers and halted a rule targeting cross-state air pollution sources. This term's cases are unlikely to have as far-reaching consequences for the energy sector as overturning Chevron. But industry officials hope the two pending cases will provide clarity on issues that have been problematic for developers, including the scope of federal environmental reviews and the ability of industry to win legal "standing" to bring lawsuits. Two other cases could have significant effects for the oil sector, if the court agrees to consider them at a conference set for 10 January. Utah has a pending complaint before the court designed to force the US to dispose of 18.5mn acres of "unappropriated" federal land in the state, including oil-producing acreage. Utah argues that indefinitely retaining the land — which covers about a third of Utah — is unconstitutional. In another pending case, Sunoco and other oil companies have asked for a ruling that could halt a series of lawsuits filed against them in state courts for alleged damages from greenhouse gas emissions. President-elect Donald Trump's re-election could create complications for cases pending before the Supreme Court, if the incoming administration adopts new legal positions. Trump plans to nominate John Sauer, who successfully represented Trump in his presidential immunity case, as his solicitor general before the Supreme Court. By Chris Knight Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: Permian waiting on new gas lines

30/12/24

Viewpoint: Permian waiting on new gas lines

Houston, 30 December (Argus) — Natural gas prices in the Permian basin of west Texas and southeast New Mexico fell to historic lows in 2024, with increased takeaway out of the region likely not picking up before 2026. Gas in the Permian basin is fundamentally tied to crude economics, with associated gas being a byproduct of crude-directed drilling. US benchmark WTI values continued to boost crude output in 2024, with month-ahead Nymex WTI futures for delivery in 2024 averaging $76.20/bl, down from $78/bl in 2023, but still much higher than in previous years since 2014. As of the week ended 20 December, the Permian basin rig count stood at 304 rigs, down by only five rigs from the same time a year prior , according to oilfield service provider Baker Hughes. The vast majority of those rigs were crude-directed. Strong associated gas output has frequently pushed spot prices at the Waha hub in west Texas into negative territory since 2019. Waha prices held positive through 2021, helped in part by increased takeaway capacity, before turning negative in four trading sessions in 2022 and seven sessions in 2023. Negative Waha prices were a much more regular feature in 2024, with sellers needing to pay buyers to take Permian gas for about 47pc of the trading sessions throughout January-November. The Waha index fell to -$7.085/mmBtu on 29 August, a historic low. But prices averaged above $2/mmBtu from the middle of November into the first half of December , buoyed by seasonally stronger demand and the end of planned and unplanned maintenance on several Permian pipelines. Spot prices at the Waha hub returned below $1/mmBtu in the final full week of December, as unseasonably mild weather crimped demand. The January-March block for Waha was $2.235/mmBtu as of 27 December, according to Argus forward curves. Spot prices often have been negative despite growing export demand from the LNG sector and for pipeline flows to Mexico. Even excluding potential flows through the most recently commissioned 1.7 Bcf/d (17.6bn m³/yr) ADCC pipeline in south Texas, aggregate feedgas flows to US liquefaction facilities edged higher to 12.9 Bcf/d in January-November from 12.75 Bcf/d a year earlier. Pipeline exports to Mexico rose to 6.06 Bcf/d in January-September from 5.7 Bcf/d a year earlier, US Energy Information Administration (EIA) data show. Pipelines out of the Permian have typically taken little time to reach capacity, as was the case when US firm Kinder Morgan's Gulf Coast Express and Permian Highway pipelines opened in 2019 and 2020, respectively, and more recently in 2021 with the Whistler pipeline. Similarly, flows on the 2.5 Bcf/d Matterhorn Express Pipeline quickly ramped up in October after the line began taking on gas in September. Takeaway capacity out of the Permian is not planned to rise much further before 2026. Several large new pipelines remain under construction or in the planning stage, including the 2 Bcf/d Apex and 2.5 Bcf/d Blackcomb pipelines, both due to enter service in 2026. Oneok's 2.8 Bcf/d Saguaro Connector pipeline is not expected before 2027. Targa's proposed Apex Pipeline, which would link the Permian to the Port Arthur LNG project, remains under consideration. Oversupply led to output cuts in more gas-directed fields in the US in 2024, but Permian gas production has been immune to the low price environment. Low or negative prices at Waha may eventually spur output cuts in the oil-oriented Permian, but that would require WTI prices falling closer to breakeven. Permian producers need WTI to be at a minimum of $62/bl to profitably drill a new well, while the breakeven price for an existing well was $38/bl, according to an April survey by consumer data platform Statista. Producers such as Chevron do plan to curb spending in the region by as much as 10pc in 2025. Chief executive Mike Wirth noted in the company's third quarter 2024 earnings call that Permian "growth will become less the driver and free cash flow will become more of the driver". Yet Permian gas, which accounts for roughly a fifth of US output, is still set to rise to 26.1 Bcf/d in 2025 from a projected 24.8 Bcf/d in 2024, according to the US EIA's December Short-Term Energy Outlook . By David Haydon Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: Mild weather may pressure gas prices in 2025

27/12/24

Viewpoint: Mild weather may pressure gas prices in 2025

Houston, 27 December (Argus) — The US natural gas market has worked to lower inventories and bring prices up this year, but a warm 2024-25 winter may once again keep storage levels elevated in the new year. US natural gas inventories at the end of the 2023-24 winter season were well above average due to minimal heating demand caused by mild winter weather and robust US production. Storage levels ended the season on 29 March at 2.259 Tcf (64bn m³) — 39pc higher than the five-year average and 23pc higher than a year earlier. The higher inventories pushed down gas prices by minimizing concerns about supply shortfalls and disincentivized production this year, as large natural gas producers such as Chesapeake Energy and EQT reduced output on low prices and minimal expected demand. These interventions helped reduce the supply glut. Total US gas inventories for the week ending 1 November were 3.932 Tcf, entering the 2024-25 winter season only 6pc higher than the five-year average and 4pc higher than a year earlier. In addition, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicted in its November Short Term Energy Outlook (STEO) that production in 2025 would be up 1pc from 2024 as lower inventories push up prices and once again incentivize production. EIA estimates that demand this winter will exceed last year's levels and keep inventories only just above average. According to December's STEO, inventories are expected to be 1.92 Tcf at the end of March 2025, only 2pc higher than the five-year average . However, the mild weather that has covered much of the country this November and December risks once again sharply cutting into heating demand, leaving inventories at the start of 2025's spring injection season high enough to again put downward pressure on gas prices. Heating demand in November was 12pc below the seasonal average, according to the National Weather Service (NWS). The mild weather caused prices at the Henry Hub, the US benchmark, to average roughly $2/mmBtu in November. However, EIA's December STEO predicted that prices at the Henry Hub would average just under $3/mmBtu for the rest of the winter heating season on expectations for cold weather. That cold weather has yet to fully materialize. While demand in the first week of December was 20pc higher than average on cold snap, temperatures since then have been above seasonal norms, with heating demand in the week ending 20 December landing at 22pc below average and demand in the week ending 28 December expected to be 26pc below average. If below-average demand continues into 2025, it is unlikely that inventories will drop as much as forecast. Prices this winter would be close to $3/mmBtu if withdrawals this season are close to 2.1 Tcf , East Daley Analytics senior director Jack Weixel said in September. US inventories had that level of withdrawal in winter from 2020-22. However, if temperatures this winter are once again well above average, Weixel said inventories could end the season more than 530 Bcf above average, cutting average prices to $2.50/mmBtu and undoing price from the smaller-than-average injection season. Prices may be especially pressured by rising production in the Permian basin of west Texas and southeastern New Mexico. Since most of the gas output from the Permian comes from oil wells, low gas prices may not affect production, as drilling decisions there are influenced by oil production rather than gas production. Prices may still rally this winter if temperatures dip low enough in January and February, offsetting the mild weather of November and December. In addition, the rise of LNG exports next year may boost demand and subsequently raise prices. Several LNG projects or expansions are currently underway in the US with the Golden Pass export terminal, the Plaquemines export terminal and the stage 3 expansion at Cheniere's Corpus Christi liquefaction terminal all expected to start up in 2025. By Anna Muthalaly Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: US gas market poised for more volatility

26/12/24

Viewpoint: US gas market poised for more volatility

New York, 26 December (Argus) — US natural gas markets may be subjected to more dramatic price swings in 2025 as growing LNG exports and increasingly price-sensitive producers place greater pressure on the US' stagnant gas storage capacity. Those price swings could pose challenges for consumers without ample access to gas supplies, as well as producers interested in keeping some output unhedged to capture potentially higher prices without taking on excessive financial risk. But volatility may also present opportunities for traders looking to exploit unstable price spreads, and for producers that can adapt their operations to fit a more unpredictable pricing environment. Calm before the storm High storage levels and low spot prices this year — averaging $2.11/mmBtu through November this year at the US benchmark Henry Hub — triggered by an unusually warm 2023-24 winter, may have obscured some of the structural factors pushing the US gas market into a more volatile future. But those structural factors remain and loom increasingly large for prices. The US has moved from a roughly 60 Bcf/d (1.7bn m³/d) market eight years ago to a more than 100 Bcf/d market today, "and we haven't grown our storage capacity at all", Rich Brockmeyer, head of North American gas and power at commodity trading house Gunvor, said earlier this year. As supply and demand for US gas grow, the country's roughly 4.7-Tcf storage capacity becomes ever less effective in stemming demand shocks, such as extreme winter weather events, which can more rapidly draw down inventories than in years past. Additionally, a growing share of US gas is being consumed by LNG export terminals being built and expanded on the US Gulf coast. When those facilities encounter unexpected problems and cease operations — as has happened numerous times at the 2 Bcf/d Freeport LNG terminal in Texas in recent years — volumes that were previously being liquefied and sent overseas were instead backed up into the domestic market, crushing prices. More LNG exports may mean more opportunities for such supply shocks. US LNG exports are expected to increase by 15pc to almost 14 Bcf/d in 2025 as operations begin at Venture Global's planned 27.2mn t/yr Plaquemines facility in Louisiana and Cheniere's 11.5mn t/yr Corpus Christi, Texas, stage 3 expansion, US Energy Information Administration data show. Spot price volatility will be most acutely felt in regions like New England that lack underground gas storage. "In areas like the Gulf coast, where you have a lot of storage, it won't be a problem," Alan Armstrong, chief executive of Williams, the largest US gas pipeline company, told Argus in an interview. Producers' trade-off Volatile gas markets are a mixed bag for producers, many of whom profit from volatility while also struggling to plan and budget based on uncertain revenues for unhedged volumes. Though insufficient gas storage deprives the market of stability, "from the standpoint of a marketing and trading guy that's trying to manage my gas supply to customers and my trading book, I love volatility",said Dennis Price, vice president of marketing and trading at Expand Energy, the largest US gas producer by volume. BP chief financial officer Sinead Gorman in November 2023 specifically named Freeport LNG's eight-month-long shutdown in 2022-23 from a fire as a driver of volatility in the global gas market. The supermajor was able to exploit the "incredibly fragile" gas market, she said, which was a key factor driving the success of its integrated gas business. "Those opportunities are what we typically seek and enjoy," Gorman said. Increasingly, producers have also been adapting to a more volatile market by switching production on and off in response to prices, but often without revealing the price at which a supply response will occur. Expand Energy, for instance, told investors in October that it was amassing drilled but uncompleted wells and wells that had yet to be brought on line, which it could activate relatively quickly when prices rise. It declined to name the price at which that would occur. Market participants, attempting to price in this phenomenon by anticipating producers' next moves may respond more dramatically to supply signals than in the past, when production was steadier. Producers' increased responsiveness to prices could help to balance the market somewhat, though more aggressive intervention into operations could take a toll on well performance and pipelines, FactSet senior energy analyst Connor McLean said. Producers are "treating the reservoir itself like a storage facility", Price said. By Julian Hast Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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