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Bolivia political deal clears gas line, urea plant

  • : Fertilizers, Natural gas
  • 19/11/25

A breakthrough in Bolivia's political crisis is clearing the way for repairs to a sabotaged natural gas pipeline and a urea plant.

Jeanine Anez, the conservative former senator who declared an interim administration after longtime president Evo Morales resigned on 10 November, struck a political compromise yesterday with Morales' Movement toward Socialism party (MAS) that will lead the country to new elections by around the end of April 2020.

Morales supporters agreed to lift roadblocks, while the Anez administration vowed to withdraw the military from the streets.

The military and police effectively abandoned Morales after he declared victory in his bid for a fourth presidential term in 20 October elections that the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS) deemed to be tainted.

Unrest broke out shortly after the elections, and later focused around La Paz and Cochabamba where Morales supporters had demanded his return. Tensions peaked last week when protesters blocked the Senkata fuel terminal in El Alto outside of La Paz.

The lifting of the roadblocks has allowed technicians to access the Carrasco-Cochabamba gas pipeline that was sabotaged in early November, allegedly by Morales supporters shortly after he fled to Mexico where he was given political asylum. Around 200m of the domestic pipeline were damaged, according to Bolivia's state-owned oil and gas company YPFB.

Bolivia's defense ministry reported that farmers agreed to allow workers from YPFB to access the pipeline and undertake repairs.

The pipeline supplies the 700,000 t/yr Bulo Bulo urea and ammonia plant in Cochabamba's jungle region. YPFB said it was too early to determine how much time would be needed to fix the line.

The plant had been producing at a reduced capacity since late October because of the roadblocks that prevented urea supply from reaching neighboring Brazil.

YPFB signed a commercial deal on 15 October with Russia's Acron to provide natural gas for urea production at a plant that the Russian company operates in Brazil's Mato Grosso do Sul state. Under the contract, Acron will help distribute urea from the Bolivian plant.

The unrest in Bolivia did not impact the country's pipeline gas exports to Brazil and Argentina which account for the bulk of the government's revenue. YPFB had warned its counterparts in both countries on 11 November of possible interruptions, but these never materialized. The operations of foreign companies, including Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Shell and Russia's Gazprom, were largely unaffected.

Evo's friends

Under ground-breaking legislation approved by the MAS-controlled congress yesterday, a new electoral board will be installed within 20 days. The board is tasked with calling elections within 120 days.

The legislation prohibits Morales and his former vice president Alvaro Garcia from running in the new elections. Garcia fled to Mexico along with Morales, a steadfast ally of Venezuela's president Nicolas Maduro, whose government is the target of US sanctions.

The indigenous Morales was first elected in 2005 on a resource nationalist platform and served nearly 14 years before resigning. Despite his rhetoric, the Morales administration provided a stable operating climate for oil and gas companies.

Morales and his supporters inside and outside Bolivia say he was the victim of a coup. Among his regional backers are Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela and Uruguay. Montevideo's stance could now swing into the anti-Morales camp if the initial results of a 24 November run-off election favoring center-right Luis Lacalle Pou are confirmed. But Argentina is shifting leftward with incoming president Alberto Fernandez, who replaces pro-business Mauricio Macri early next month.

By Lucien Chauvin and Patricia Garip


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25/01/02

EU sulphur shortage persists, limiting sul acid output

EU sulphur shortage persists, limiting sul acid output

London, 2 January (Argus) — Liquid sulphur in Northwest Europe is expected to remain short in 2025, with production limited by lower output from refineries, and demand outstripping supply. Sulphur supply curbed In the past two years sulphur output from European refineries has dropped as a result of poor refining margins and competition from imports from new mega-refineries out of region. Additionally, sanctions on Russian crude oil imports to European refineries have turned the crude slate in the region sweeter. In 2024 refinery maintenance and unexpected outages resulted in lower production of molten sulphur. These were overdue following healthy refining margins in 2023 leading refineries to run at high rates and postponing maintenance, as well as earlier pandemic restrictions also limiting maintenance. Further European refining capacity is at risk in 2025, as Petroineos' Grangemouth refinery in Scotland is expected to be converted to an import terminal, while in Germany, Shell will cease crude processing at its 80,000 t/yr Wesseling refinery. Additionally, BP has indicated plans to permanently shut down a crude unit and a middle distillate desulphurisation unit at its 210,000 t/yr Gelsenkirchen plant. Refineries could still delay some of these closures, provided that refining margins were supportive of this. Sulphur consumption is higher though risks remain Sulphur consumers were running at low rates in Europe over 2023 due to low demand and poor economics as well as high energy prices. By 2024 sulphur demand lifted, and many consumers were unable to source the larger quantity of sulphur. The shortfall of molten sulphur bolstered quarterly contract prices during 2024; in the first quarter prices stood at $103.5-119.5/t cfr, rising 49pc on a mid-point basis to reach $158.5-174.5/t cfr in the fourth quarter. Contract negotiations for the first quarter of 2025 started against a backdrop of a short market and firmer global prices weighed against competitiveness of the region's chemical industry, with consumers seeking a rollover or a smaller increase of $10-15/t cfr against suppliers pushing for a larger $25-30/t rise. In 2025 liquid sulphur is expected to continue to be short in the region, with regular liquid imports. Discussions for an additional sulphur tanker are also expected to lead to more imported product entering the region by the second half of 2025. Yara's sulphur remelter in Finland is expected to start in April 2025, but will have limited impact on the industrial cluster in the Benelux and German regions. Additionally, at least one new commercial sulphur burner is expected in Germany for a 2027 start to operations, with the Mitsui subsidiary Aglobis announcing preliminary agreements with port and logistics operators in Germany's Duisburg area. Sulphuric acid implications The shortage in liquid sulphur has resulted in a new reality sulphuric acid in Northwest Europe, resulting in a wider differential between sulphur-burnt and smelter-based acid, of up to €80/t, on the quarterly contracts. The acid contracts for the first quarter of 2025 are not fully settled, the sulphur burnt contract was heard at a further increase of €15 added to the sulphur Benelux settlement, while an increase of around €10/t was heard for smelter-based acid. Some sulphur-burners have been forced to shut down in the Benelux region, mainly due lack of liquid sulphur. Additionally, there is the risk that some end used may be pushed out of the market due to the increased cost of sourcing sulphur burnt acid. And while some demand may continue to shift to smelter-based acid, not all sulphur burners or downstream industries can easily replace liquid sulphur as a feedstock due to purity or economic implications. By Jasmine Antunes, Maria Mosquera and Lili Minton Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged


25/01/02
25/01/02

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

London, 2 January (Argus) — The European Commission needs to provide clearer guidance on implementing existing rules for the cross-border trade of biomethane to foster a cohesive internal market as some EU member states are diverging from these standards, Vitol's Davide Rubini and Arthur Romano told Argus. Edited excerpts follow. What are the big changes happening in the regulation space of the European biomethane market that people need to watch out for? While no major new EU legislation is anticipated, the focus remains on the consistent implementation of existing rules, as some countries diverge from these standards. Key challenges include ensuring mass-balanced transport of biomethane within the grid, accurately accounting for cross-border emissions and integrating subsidised biomethane into compliance markets. The European Commission is urged to provide clearer guidance on these issues to foster a cohesive internal market, which is essential for advancing the EU's energy transition and sustainability objectives. Biomethane is a fairly mature energy carrier, yet it faces significant hurdles when it comes to cross-border trade within the EU. Currently, only a small fraction — 2-5pc — of biomethane is consumed outside of its country of production, highlighting the need for better regulatory alignment across member states. Would you be interested in seeing a longer-term target from the EU? The longer the visibility on targets and ambitions, the better it is for planning and investment. As the EU legislative cycle restarts with the new commission, the initial focus might be on the climate law and setting a new target for 2040. However, a review of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is unlikely for the next 3-4 years. With current targets set for 2030, just five years away, there's insufficient support for long-term investments. The EU's legislative cycle is fixed, so expectations for changes are low. Therefore, it's crucial that member states take initiative and extend their targets beyond 2030, potentially up to 2035, even if not mandated by the EU. Some member states might do so, recognising the need for longer-term targets to encourage the necessary capital expenditure for the energy transition. Do you see different interpretations in mass balancing, GHG accounting and subsidies? Interpretations of the rules around ‘mass-balancing', greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting and the usability of subsidised biomethane [for different fuel blending mandates] vary across EU member states, leading to challenges in creating a cohesive internal market. When it comes to mass-balancing, the challenges arise in trying to apply mass balance rules for liquids, which often have a physically traceable flow, to gas molecules in the interconnected European grid. Once biomethane is injected, physical verification becomes impossible, necessitating different rules than those for liquids moving around in segregated batches. The EU mandates that sustainability verification of biomethane occurs at the production point and requires mechanisms to prevent double counting and verification of biomethane transactions. However, some member states resist adapting these rules for gases, insisting on physical traceability similar to that of liquids. This resistance may stem from protectionist motives or political agendas, but ultimately it results in non-adherence to EU rules and breaches of European legislation. The issue with GHG accounting often stems from member states' differing interpretations of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Some states, like the Netherlands, argue that mass balance is an administrative method, which the guidelines supposedly exclude. Mass balancing involves rigorous verification by auditors and certifying bodies, ensuring a robust accounting system that is distinct from book and claim methods. This distinction is crucial because mass balance is based on verifying that traded molecules of biomethane are always accompanied by proofs of sustainability that are not a separately tradeable object. In fact, mass balancing provides a verifiable and accountable method that is perfectly aligned with UN guidelines and ensuring accurate GHG accounting. The issue related to the use of subsidised volumes of biomethane is highly political. Member states often argue that if they provide financial support — directly through subsidies or indirectly through suppliers' quotas — they should remain in control of the entire value chain. For example, if a member state gives feed-in tariffs to biomethane production, it may want to block exports of these volumes. Conversely, if a member state imposes a quota to gas suppliers, it may require this to be fulfilled with domestic biomethane production. No other commodity — not even football players — is subject to similar restrictions to export and/or imports only because subsidies are involved. This protectionist approach creates barriers to internal trade within the EU, hindering the development of a unified biomethane market and limiting the potential for growth and decarbonisation across the region. The Netherlands next year will implement two significant pieces of legislation — a green supply obligation for gas suppliers and a RED III transposition. The Dutch approach combines GHG accounting arguments with a rejection of EU mass-balance rules, essentially prohibiting biomethane imports unless physically segregated as bio-LNG or bio-CNG. This requirement contradicts EU law, as highlighted by the EU Commission's recent detailed opinion to the Netherlands . France's upcoming blending and green gas obligation, effective in 2026, mandates satisfaction through French production only. Similarly, the Czech Republic recently enacted a law prohibiting the export of some subsidised biomethane . Italy's transport system, while effective nationally, disregards EU mass balance rules. These cases indicate a deeper political disconnect and highlight the need for better alignment and communication within the EU. We know you've been getting a lot of questions around whether subsidised bio-LNG is eligible under FuelEU. What have your findings been? The eligibility of subsidised bio-LNG under FuelEU has been a topic of considerable enquiry. We've sought clarity from the European Commission, as this issue intersects multiple regulatory and legal frameworks. Initially, we interpreted EU law principles, which discourage double support, to mean that FuelEU, being a quota system, would qualify as a support scheme under Article 2's definition, equating quota systems with subsidies. However, a commission representative has publicly stated that FuelEU does not constitute a support scheme and thus is not subject to this interpretation. On this basis, FuelEU would not differentiate between subsidised and unsubsidised bio-LNG. A similar rationale applies to the Emissions Trading System, which, while not a quota obligation, has been deemed to not be a support scheme. Despite these clarifications, the use of subsidised biomethane across Europe remains an area requiring further elucidation from European institutions. It is not without risks, and stakeholders require more definitive guidance to navigate the regulatory landscape effectively. By Emma Tribe and Madeleine Jenkins Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Ethiopia’s EABC counters at $639/t cfr for DAP


25/01/02
25/01/02

Ethiopia’s EABC counters at $639/t cfr for DAP

London, 2 January (Argus) — Fertilizer importer Ethiopian Agricultural Businesses (EABC) has countered offers for lots 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 at $639/t fob under its 23 December tender to buy DAP. Suppliers have until 10:00am on 5 January to respond. Reports that EABC awarded lot 4 — 60,000t with laycan 9-15 February — to trading firm Midgulf International at the offered price of $639/t fob Jordan have emerged. But Jordanian producer JPMC has so far not committed to supplying this cargo to Midgulf International. EABC has not given counterbids for lots 7, 8 or 9, and has probably scrapped these lots. Offers for DAP from Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and China totalled 780,000t and ranged $639-705/t fob . EABC had initially sought to buy 611,000t in the tender. The importer stipulated laycans for its counterbids in a document seen by Argus as follows: Lot 1: 16-22 January Lot 2: 25-30 January Lot 3: 1-5 February Lot 5: 10-15 February Lot 6: 21-25 February Each lot is for 60,000t. Initially, the laycans for lots 5 and 6 had been 21-27 February and 5-11 March, respectively. By Tom Hampson Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

India extends special DAP subsidy and keeps MRP steady


25/01/02
25/01/02

India extends special DAP subsidy and keeps MRP steady

London, 2 January (Argus) — The Indian government yesterday extended the special DAP subsidy of Rs3,500/t into the new year, while local sources say the maximum retail price (MRP) will remain unchanged. The special subsidy, which was approved in July 2024 and valid from April 2024 , was initially set to end on 31 December. It will now remain in place until further notice. This subsidy supplements the existing nutrient based subsidy (NBS) of Rs21,911/t for the 2024-25 rabi season (October-March). In mid-December local sources reported that the government would allow the MRP to rise by around Rs4,000/t to about Rs31,000/t from 1 January. But sources now state the MRP will remain at Rs27,000/t. DAP importers buying at $632/t cfr face losses of around $101/t with the current dollar-rupee exchange rate, MRP and NBS including the special subsidy. The government is set to keep compensating importers for these losses until the end of March. Provisional data indicates India was on track to end 2024 with 1.2mn t of DAP in stocks because of slowing imports, well below a comfortable 2mn t, as had been maintained in previous years. By Adrien Seewald Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Pupuk Indonesia issues tender to buy January amsul


25/01/02
25/01/02

Pupuk Indonesia issues tender to buy January amsul

Singapore, 2 January (Argus) — State-owned Pupuk Indonesia has issued a tender to buy 20,000t of bulk standard caprolactam-grade ammonium sulphate (amsul) for shipment to its subsidiary Petrokimia Gresik by the fourth week of January. Pupuk Indonesia has requested a single shipment of 20,000t to Gresik port. The deadline for submitting technical documents is 2 January, and the importer has asked for offers to be submitted at a fixed price. No results have been heard and the online e-auction for the tender is expected to begin shortly. By Dinise Chng Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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