Fossil fuel cars phase-out comes up again in Brussels

Spanish Market: Biofuels, Electricity, Emissions, Fertilizers
07/10/24

The European parliament will this week debate a "crisis" facing the EU's automotive industry which could lead to "potential" plant closures, putting discussions on already-decided CO2 standards for vehicles on the forefront.

Members have faced increased efforts by industry arguing for or against speedy review of the EU's regulation on CO2 emission standards for cars and vans. The regulation sets a 2035 phase-out target for new fossil fuel cars.

The European commission is expected to give a statement to parliament, but a spokesperson told Argus that any change to the EU CO2 standards for cars and light vehicles would require a legal proposal by the commission to both parliament and EU member states.

The priority, the spokesperson said, is on meeting 2025 targets for fleet CO2 reductions, agreed in 2019, but the commission is aware of "different opinions" in industry.

Automakers association Acea has been calling for a "substantive and holistic" review of the CO2 regulation. The transition to zero-emission vehicles must be made "more manageable", assessing real-world progress against the ambition level. On the other hand, European power industry association Eurelectric today told members of parliament that bringing forward a review of the EU's regulation on CO2 standards for cars and vans to the start of 2025 would only encourage carmakers to hold off on making lower-priced and smaller electric vehicles (EV).

The next CO2 target for car fleets is set to take effect in 2025. It requires a 15pc cut in emissions for newly registered cars. Some member states view the CO2 target cuts, and phase-out of the internal combustion engine (ICE) by 2035, as contentious. The regulation was only approved after a delay to normally formal approval. And parliament's largest centre-right EPP group is calling for a revision of CO2 standards for new cars to allow for alternative zero-emission fuels beyond 2035.

As a counterweight to such pressure, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch and Irish ministers today called on commission president Ursula von der Leyen to step up EU action to push decarbonisation of company vehicles, notably light duty vehicles. "We need to consider action on the demand side in order to push zero-emission vehicles sales. Corporate fleets are the EU's most important market segment," the four ministers told von der Leyen.

By Dafydd ab Iago

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02/01/25

EU sulphur shortage persists, limiting sul acid output

London, 2 January (Argus) — Liquid sulphur in Northwest Europe is expected to remain short in 2025, with production limited by lower output from refineries, and demand outstripping supply. Sulphur supply curbed In the past two years sulphur output from European refineries has dropped as a result of poor refining margins and competition from imports from new mega-refineries out of region. Additionally, sanctions on Russian crude oil imports to European refineries have turned the crude slate in the region sweeter. In 2024 refinery maintenance and unexpected outages resulted in lower production of molten sulphur. These were overdue following healthy refining margins in 2023 leading refineries to run at high rates and postponing maintenance, as well as earlier pandemic restrictions also limiting maintenance. Further European refining capacity is at risk in 2025, as Petroineos' Grangemouth refinery in Scotland is expected to be converted to an import terminal, while in Germany, Shell will cease crude processing at its 80,000 t/yr Wesseling refinery. Additionally, BP has indicated plans to permanently shut down a crude unit and a middle distillate desulphurisation unit at its 210,000 t/yr Gelsenkirchen plant. Refineries could still delay some of these closures, provided that refining margins were supportive of this. Sulphur consumption is higher though risks remain Sulphur consumers were running at low rates in Europe over 2023 due to low demand and poor economics as well as high energy prices. By 2024 sulphur demand lifted, and many consumers were unable to source the larger quantity of sulphur. The shortfall of molten sulphur bolstered quarterly contract prices during 2024; in the first quarter prices stood at $103.5-119.5/t cfr, rising 49pc on a mid-point basis to reach $158.5-174.5/t cfr in the fourth quarter. Contract negotiations for the first quarter of 2025 started against a backdrop of a short market and firmer global prices weighed against competitiveness of the region's chemical industry, with consumers seeking a rollover or a smaller increase of $10-15/t cfr against suppliers pushing for a larger $25-30/t rise. In 2025 liquid sulphur is expected to continue to be short in the region, with regular liquid imports. Discussions for an additional sulphur tanker are also expected to lead to more imported product entering the region by the second half of 2025. Yara's sulphur remelter in Finland is expected to start in April 2025, but will have limited impact on the industrial cluster in the Benelux and German regions. Additionally, at least one new commercial sulphur burner is expected in Germany for a 2027 start to operations, with the Mitsui subsidiary Aglobis announcing preliminary agreements with port and logistics operators in Germany's Duisburg area. Sulphuric acid implications The shortage in liquid sulphur has resulted in a new reality sulphuric acid in Northwest Europe, resulting in a wider differential between sulphur-burnt and smelter-based acid, of up to €80/t, on the quarterly contracts. The acid contracts for the first quarter of 2025 are not fully settled, the sulphur burnt contract was heard at a further increase of €15 added to the sulphur Benelux settlement, while an increase of around €10/t was heard for smelter-based acid. Some sulphur-burners have been forced to shut down in the Benelux region, mainly due lack of liquid sulphur. Additionally, there is the risk that some end used may be pushed out of the market due to the increased cost of sourcing sulphur burnt acid. And while some demand may continue to shift to smelter-based acid, not all sulphur burners or downstream industries can easily replace liquid sulphur as a feedstock due to purity or economic implications. By Jasmine Antunes, Maria Mosquera and Lili Minton Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

02/01/25

Q&A: EU biomethane internal market challenged

London, 2 January (Argus) — The European Commission needs to provide clearer guidance on implementing existing rules for the cross-border trade of biomethane to foster a cohesive internal market as some EU member states are diverging from these standards, Vitol's Davide Rubini and Arthur Romano told Argus. Edited excerpts follow. What are the big changes happening in the regulation space of the European biomethane market that people need to watch out for? While no major new EU legislation is anticipated, the focus remains on the consistent implementation of existing rules, as some countries diverge from these standards. Key challenges include ensuring mass-balanced transport of biomethane within the grid, accurately accounting for cross-border emissions and integrating subsidised biomethane into compliance markets. The European Commission is urged to provide clearer guidance on these issues to foster a cohesive internal market, which is essential for advancing the EU's energy transition and sustainability objectives. Biomethane is a fairly mature energy carrier, yet it faces significant hurdles when it comes to cross-border trade within the EU. Currently, only a small fraction — 2-5pc — of biomethane is consumed outside of its country of production, highlighting the need for better regulatory alignment across member states. Would you be interested in seeing a longer-term target from the EU? The longer the visibility on targets and ambitions, the better it is for planning and investment. As the EU legislative cycle restarts with the new commission, the initial focus might be on the climate law and setting a new target for 2040. However, a review of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is unlikely for the next 3-4 years. With current targets set for 2030, just five years away, there's insufficient support for long-term investments. The EU's legislative cycle is fixed, so expectations for changes are low. Therefore, it's crucial that member states take initiative and extend their targets beyond 2030, potentially up to 2035, even if not mandated by the EU. Some member states might do so, recognising the need for longer-term targets to encourage the necessary capital expenditure for the energy transition. Do you see different interpretations in mass balancing, GHG accounting and subsidies? Interpretations of the rules around ‘mass-balancing', greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting and the usability of subsidised biomethane [for different fuel blending mandates] vary across EU member states, leading to challenges in creating a cohesive internal market. When it comes to mass-balancing, the challenges arise in trying to apply mass balance rules for liquids, which often have a physically traceable flow, to gas molecules in the interconnected European grid. Once biomethane is injected, physical verification becomes impossible, necessitating different rules than those for liquids moving around in segregated batches. The EU mandates that sustainability verification of biomethane occurs at the production point and requires mechanisms to prevent double counting and verification of biomethane transactions. However, some member states resist adapting these rules for gases, insisting on physical traceability similar to that of liquids. This resistance may stem from protectionist motives or political agendas, but ultimately it results in non-adherence to EU rules and breaches of European legislation. The issue with GHG accounting often stems from member states' differing interpretations of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Some states, like the Netherlands, argue that mass balance is an administrative method, which the guidelines supposedly exclude. Mass balancing involves rigorous verification by auditors and certifying bodies, ensuring a robust accounting system that is distinct from book and claim methods. This distinction is crucial because mass balance is based on verifying that traded molecules of biomethane are always accompanied by proofs of sustainability that are not a separately tradeable object. In fact, mass balancing provides a verifiable and accountable method that is perfectly aligned with UN guidelines and ensuring accurate GHG accounting. The issue related to the use of subsidised volumes of biomethane is highly political. Member states often argue that if they provide financial support — directly through subsidies or indirectly through suppliers' quotas — they should remain in control of the entire value chain. For example, if a member state gives feed-in tariffs to biomethane production, it may want to block exports of these volumes. Conversely, if a member state imposes a quota to gas suppliers, it may require this to be fulfilled with domestic biomethane production. No other commodity — not even football players — is subject to similar restrictions to export and/or imports only because subsidies are involved. This protectionist approach creates barriers to internal trade within the EU, hindering the development of a unified biomethane market and limiting the potential for growth and decarbonisation across the region. The Netherlands next year will implement two significant pieces of legislation — a green supply obligation for gas suppliers and a RED III transposition. The Dutch approach combines GHG accounting arguments with a rejection of EU mass-balance rules, essentially prohibiting biomethane imports unless physically segregated as bio-LNG or bio-CNG. This requirement contradicts EU law, as highlighted by the EU Commission's recent detailed opinion to the Netherlands . France's upcoming blending and green gas obligation, effective in 2026, mandates satisfaction through French production only. Similarly, the Czech Republic recently enacted a law prohibiting the export of some subsidised biomethane . Italy's transport system, while effective nationally, disregards EU mass balance rules. These cases indicate a deeper political disconnect and highlight the need for better alignment and communication within the EU. We know you've been getting a lot of questions around whether subsidised bio-LNG is eligible under FuelEU. What have your findings been? The eligibility of subsidised bio-LNG under FuelEU has been a topic of considerable enquiry. We've sought clarity from the European Commission, as this issue intersects multiple regulatory and legal frameworks. Initially, we interpreted EU law principles, which discourage double support, to mean that FuelEU, being a quota system, would qualify as a support scheme under Article 2's definition, equating quota systems with subsidies. However, a commission representative has publicly stated that FuelEU does not constitute a support scheme and thus is not subject to this interpretation. On this basis, FuelEU would not differentiate between subsidised and unsubsidised bio-LNG. A similar rationale applies to the Emissions Trading System, which, while not a quota obligation, has been deemed to not be a support scheme. Despite these clarifications, the use of subsidised biomethane across Europe remains an area requiring further elucidation from European institutions. It is not without risks, and stakeholders require more definitive guidance to navigate the regulatory landscape effectively. By Emma Tribe and Madeleine Jenkins Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: Trump, macro issues ahead for US renewables

02/01/25

Viewpoint: Trump, macro issues ahead for US renewables

Houston, 2 January (Argus) — A combination of substantial policy shifts under president-elect Donald Trump and macroeconomic issues puts the US renewable power sector on uncertain footing to begin 2025. Analysts expect the federal tax credits that have bolstered new renewable generation during its substantial growth over the past decade will survive in some fashion, although Trump campaigned on repealing the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). He also has promised 60pc tariffs on goods imported from China, a major player in the solar and battery storage supply chains. The ultimate effects may vary by project type and what the new administration is able to accomplish. Chinese solar products already face 50pc tariffs , which could temper any effects on the industry from Trump's protectionist trade policies, said Tom Harper, a partner at consultant Baringa specializing in power and renewables. But the new administration could make it more difficult to claim IRA incentives and could roll back federal power plant emissions rules , creating an environment that could slow the adoption of renewables. Utilities may become more cautious in using renewables because of higher costs, while others, such as companies with sustainability goals, might be able to weather the change, according to Harper. "There might be some very price insensitive corporate [power purchase agreement] buyers out there who are looking at a $45/MWh solar [contract] and now it's going to be $50/MWh after the tariff, and they'll be fine," he said. In addition, the US renewables industry is still weathering headwinds from supply chain constraints, increased borrowing rates and inflation, which have hampered new projects. For example, the PJM Interconnection — which spans 13 mostly Mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia — had approved more than 37,000MW of generation at the end of third quarter 2024, with only 2,400MW of that partially in service. Developers have blamed the delays on financing challenges, long lead times for obtaining equipment and local opposition to projects. Global problems, local solutions Changes to state procurement strategies could help. Maryland state delegate Lorig Charkoudian (D) next year will propose new state-run solar, wind and hydropower solicitations that would first target projects that have already cleared PJM's reviews. Her approach would echo programs in New Jersey and Illinois, and ultimately reduce utilities' reliance on renewable energy certificates (REC) procured elsewhere. "The idea is to give a path for these projects, so presumably they can be built within a few years," Charkoudian said. Utilities would use the new procurements for the bulk of their RECs, covering remaining demand by buying legacy Maryland solar credits and other PJM RECs on the secondary market. But a quick fix for Maryland's broader renewable energy objectives is unlikely after utilities used the alternative compliance payment (ACP) for two-thirds of their 2023 REC requirements. The fee for each megawatt-hour by which utilities miss their compliance targets serves as a de facto ceiling on REC prices. Maryland's ACP is low compared to neighboring states, where the qualifying REC pool overlaps, meaning that credits eligible in the state can fetch a higher price elsewhere. While lawmakers could raise the ACP to mitigate those issues, those costs would ultimately fall on utility customers. "As best as I can tell, the options are raise the ACP or adjust how we do it," Charkoudian said. "We're really concerned about ratepayer impacts, and so I don't think there's a real appetite to raise the ACP." In other states, the policy landscape is less certain. Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro (D) has no clear path for his proposed hike to the state's alternative energy mandate, should he choose to revisit it, after Republicans retained their state Senate majority in November. New Jersey state senator Bob Smith (D) has been working for two years to enshrine in law governor Phil Murphy's (D) goal of 100pc clean electricity, but the proposal failed to escape committee in 2024 after dying in 2023 over opposition to its support for offshore wind . Is the answer blowing in the wind? Offshore wind is a slightly different matter. Trump has been critical of the industry and federal regulators control much of the project permitting in the US. Moreover, as a burgeoning sector with higher costs, it could be more sensitive to the loss of the investment tax credit (ITC). Based on current expenses, Baringa's analysis suggests that losing the ITC could increase project costs by "at least" $30/MWh and push offshore wind REC prices in some cases near $150/MWh. That would be a "difficult cost for states to swallow", according to Harper. "We've seen a few offshore wind developers already say, 'Hey, we're not going to spend a dime more until we know what's going on,'" Harper said. Despite the challenging landscape, Charkoudian expects Maryland will move forward in areas it can control, such as expanding the onshore transmission, that will make offshore wind viable, whether it's now or "eight years from now". By Patrick Zemanek Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Viewpoint: US utilities worry over railcar supply

02/01/25

Viewpoint: US utilities worry over railcar supply

Washington, 2 January (Argus) — US utilities are concerned that they may not have enough railcars to haul coal in the future as multiple power plants are seeking to remain in operation longer than expected. Power demand is forecast to rise in the coming years because of planned data centers in multiple parts of the country. Many data centers are expected to open before new generation, including natural gas, wind and solar-power units, go into service. A number of utilities want to avert the temporary power shortage by extending the life of coal-fired power plants beyond planned retirement dates. In response, demand is "poised to shift to a slight growth in the need for coal cars", according to railcar expert Richard Kloster, president of Integrity Rail Partners. Longer power plant lives as well as expectations of increased metallurgical coal exports are likely to provide demand for equipment. But the supply of railcars for coal has been slowly shrinking. No new railcars for the coal industry — primarily gondolas or open-top hoppers — have been built in nearly a decade. Utilities and leasing companies have had little interest in ordering new railcars for a shrinking sector. Many existing cars have also been scrapped, particularly during periods of low coal demand and high scrap prices during the last few years. There also are thousands of coal railcars in storage, but those do not really count towards demand, Kloster said. The cost of pulling those cars out of storage and making them service-ready is not necessarily cost effective, he said. About 21pc of North American coal cars were in storage at the beginning of August, up from 15pc in November 2022, according to Association of American Railroads data. In comparison, about 35pc of the coal car fleet was in storage at the start of July 2020, near the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Possibilities of new construction There is a chance that "in the next 10 years, there will be coal cars built again", because many coal cars in the fleet are nearing 50 years of age, Kloster said. The retirement of many cars means that equipment must be pulled from storage or new units built, driving potential construction. Under Association of American Railroads (AAR) rules, railcars built after June 1974 can only be interchanged with other railroads for 50 years. After that, those cars are generally limited to operating on only one carrier. Some of those older cars may be retired early if they need repairs. Maintenance expenses could cause car owners to take units out of service. Utilities strategize Some utilities are already implementing plans to secure railcars, but others think taking additional steps will be unnecessary, according to railcar expert Darell Luther, chief executive of rail transportation firm Tealinc. The differing views are tied in part to whether utilities are regulated by states or merchant-owned, Luther said. Public utilities need to prove to regulators they can meet generating needs, including having enough coal and railcars. Privately owned operators have more flexibility in terms of contracting for coal and railcars. Several utility rail managers told Argus they do not see the need to take extra steps to secure railcars, confident that they already have plenty or can lease whatever they need in the future. But other utilities said they have taken steps to ensure they have coal cars in the future. Some utilities have purchased single or multiple cars as other generators sell them off. Others are increasingly leasing cars, with one utility saying that having more cars than needed is a cheap way of ensuring future supply. By Abby Caplan Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Ethiopia’s EABC counters at $639/t cfr for DAP

02/01/25

Ethiopia’s EABC counters at $639/t cfr for DAP

London, 2 January (Argus) — Fertilizer importer Ethiopian Agricultural Businesses (EABC) has countered offers for lots 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 at $639/t fob under its 23 December tender to buy DAP. Suppliers have until 10:00am on 5 January to respond. Reports that EABC awarded lot 4 — 60,000t with laycan 9-15 February — to trading firm Midgulf International at the offered price of $639/t fob Jordan have emerged. But Jordanian producer JPMC has so far not committed to supplying this cargo to Midgulf International. EABC has not given counterbids for lots 7, 8 or 9, and has probably scrapped these lots. Offers for DAP from Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and China totalled 780,000t and ranged $639-705/t fob . EABC had initially sought to buy 611,000t in the tender. The importer stipulated laycans for its counterbids in a document seen by Argus as follows: Lot 1: 16-22 January Lot 2: 25-30 January Lot 3: 1-5 February Lot 5: 10-15 February Lot 6: 21-25 February Each lot is for 60,000t. Initially, the laycans for lots 5 and 6 had been 21-27 February and 5-11 March, respectively. By Tom Hampson Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2025. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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